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COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PIPE SPECIALTY, INC., * 
(A Utah Corporation) * BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL 
* COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Petitioner/ * 
* APPELLATE CASE NO: 930353-CA 
VS. * 
* 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF * PRIORITY NO. 7 
UTAH# and SALVADORE MONTOYA/ * 
Respondents. * 
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (a) , Utah Code Ann. §35-1-86 and 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (1) grant the Utah Court of Appeals 
jurisdiction over Pipe Specialty/s Petition For Review. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. In light of Pipe Specialty7s untimely Motion For Review to 
the Commission, does the Court have jurisdiction to consider the 
merits of Pipe Specialty's Petition For Review? The Court has 
plenary authority over this purely legal issue. Silva v. 
Department of Employment Security, 786 P. 2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 
1990). 
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2. Did the Commission err in denying Pipe Specialty's request 
for relief from default? Through the interplay of Utah Code Ann. 
63-46b-ll(3) (c) and Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Commission is granted discretion to determine 
whether a party's default should be set aside. Such a 
determination should therefore be reviewed under a "reasonableness 
and rationality" standard pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-
16(4)(h)(i). King v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
3. Does the record support the ALJ and Commission's award of 
medical expenses and compensation to Mr. Montoya. The Commission's 
determinations of fact are reviewed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-16(4)(g) under the "substantial evidence" standard. King v. 
Industrial. Commission, Ibid. 
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF STATUTE AND RULE 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. S35-1-45 (1988) 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured 
and the dependents of each such employee who is killed, 
by accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury 
or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, 
such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this 
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment 
of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, 
and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be 
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the 
employee. 
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Utah Code Ann. 535-1-81 
(1) In addition to the compensation provided for in 
this chapter the employer or the insurance carrier shall 
pay a reasonable sum for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services, for medicines, and for artificial means, 
appliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the injured 
employee. 
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-ll (1993) 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default 
against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to participate in the adjudicative proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to attend or participate in a properly scheduled 
hearing after receiving proper notice; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative 
proceeding fails to file a response under Section 
63-46b-6. 
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of the 
grounds for default and shall be mailed to all parties. 
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency 
set aside the default order, and any order in the 
adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to the default 
order, by following the procedures outlined in the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any 
subsequent order shall be made to the presiding officer. 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under 
Section 63-46b-12, or reconsideration under Section 
63-46b-13, only on the decision of the presiding officer 
on the motion to set aside the default. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the 
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun by a party 
that has other parties besides the party in default, the 
presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of 
default, conduct any further proceedings necessary to 
complete the adjudicative proceeding without the 
participation of the party in default and shall determine 
all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including 
those affecting the defaulting party. 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no 
parties other than the agency and the party in default, 
the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of 
default, dismiss the proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-12(1)(a) (1993) 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit 
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review of 
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an order by the agency or by a superior agency, the 
aggrieved party may file a written request for review 
within 3 0 days after the issuance of the order with the 
person or entity designated for that purpose by the 
statute or rule. 
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-14(2) 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after 
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except 
that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or any 
other statute states that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial 
review of the requirement to exhaust any or all 
administrative remedies if: (i) the 
administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit 
derived from requiring exhaustion. 
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-16(4) (1993) 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on 
its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure 
or decision-making process, or has failed to follow 
prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were 
subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination 
of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, 
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unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving 
facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational 
basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
RULES 
Rule 55(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(c) For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry 
of default and, if a judgment by default has been 
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with 
Rule 60(b). 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(b) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, 
the summons in an action has not been personally served 
upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which 
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months 
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not 
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court 
to entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion 
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Workers' Compensation Rules—Utah Administrative Code R568-1-4.E. 
When an employer or insurance carrier fails to file an 
answer within the 30 days provided above, the Commission 
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may enter a default against such employer or insurance 
carrier. The Commission may then set the matter for 
hearing, take evidence bearing on the claim, and enter an 
Order based on the evidence presented. Such defaults may 
be set aside by following the procedure outlined in the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Said default shall apply 
to the defendant employer or insurance carrier and shall 
not be construed to deprive the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund of any appropriate 
defenses. 
NATURE OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 
AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter is before the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Pipe Specialty's Petition For Review of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah's final Order awarding workers' compensation benefits to 
Salvador Montoya. 
On October 1, 1991, Mr. Montoya was injured in an industrial 
accident while employed by Pipe Specialty. (R. 0001) Mr. Montoya 
incurred medical expenses of $935.25 for treatment of the injury. 
(R. 00082 to 00092) Also because of the injury, he was unable to 
work from October 1, 1991 until January 3, 1992. (R. 00092) 
On October 22, 1991, Mr. Montoya filed an Application For 
Hearing under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act (Utah Code Ann. §3 5-
1 et seq.) seeking a determination that Pipe Specialty was liable 
for payment of his medical expenses and temporary disability 
compensation arising from the accident. (R. 00001) 
On January 30, 1992, the Commission's Adjudication Division 
notified Pipe Specialty in writing that it had received Mr. 
Montoya's Application For Hearing. (R. 00006) The Adjudication 
Division enclosed a copy of Mr. Montoya's Application For Hearing 
with its letter and instructed Pipe Specialty as follows: 
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You must file with the Commission a written Answer to 
said Application within thirty (3 0) days from the date of 
this letter. . . . Failure to file an Answer within 
thirty (30) days may result in an entry of your default 
and the Commission will proceed without further notice to 
you to enter an Order disposing of the Application. 
The foregoing notice was mailed to Pipe Specialty at 4425 West 
12600 South, Riverton, Utah 84065. (R. 00008) Pipe Specialty 
received the notice but did not file an Answer. (R. 00060-61) 
On March 20, 1992, the ALJ entered Pipe Specialty's default. 
(R. 00010) A copy of the Default Order was mailed to Pipe 
Specialty that same day, at its correct address of record. (R. 
00011) 
The ALJ proceeded to adjudicate Mr. Montoya's claim and issue 
his Order awarding medical expenses, temporary compensation and 
attorney's fees to Mr. Montoya. (R. 000200) The Order also 
contained the following provision regarding appeal rights: 
. . . Any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall be 
filed in writing within thirty (3 0) days of the date 
hereof, . . . and unless so filed, this Order shall be 
final and not subject to review or appeal. 
The Order was mailed to Pipe Specialty at its correct address of 
record on October 19, 1993. (R.00020 to R.00023) 
On November 19, 1992, Pipe Specialty's attorney filed a Motion 
For Review with the Commission. (R.00033) The Motion For Review 
asked the Commission to set aside the default entered against Pipe 
Specialty, to reopen Mr. Montoya's workers' compensation claim and 
remand the claim to the ALJ to allow Pipe Specialty to contest the 
claim. (R. 00033) As a basis for setting aside Pipe Specialty's 
default, the Motion For Review alleged that Mr. Montoya had told 
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officers of Pipe Specialty that he did not intend to pursue his 
workers' compensation claim, and for that reason Pipe Specialty had 
not filed an Answer. Pipe Specialty filed no supporting affidavits 
or other evidence in support of its Motion For Review. (R.00033 to 
00034.) 
On January 6, 1993, the Commission denied Pipe Specialty's 
Motion For Review. (R.00039, 00041) The Commission's Order was 
mailed directly to Pipe Specialty instead of its attorney. 
(R.00042) On April 12, 1993, Pipe Specialty's attorney filed a 
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission. (R.00044 and 
00045) The Commission took no action on the Request, which was 
therefore deemed denied on May 3, 1993. (R.00052) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because Pipe Specialty's Motion For Review was filed beyond 
the time limit established by Section 63-46b-12(l) of Utah's 
Administrative Procedures Act, the Commission had no jurisdiction 
to consider the Motion. Consequently, Pipe Specialty lost its 
right to any further administrative or judicial review. Although 
the Commission raises this issue for the first time in this brief, 
such issues of jurisdiction may be raised at any time in the 
proceeding. 
If, despite Pipe Specialty's untimely Motion For Review, the 
Court concludes that it has jurisdiction in this matter, the Court 
should find that the Commission's refusal to set aside Pipe 
Specialty's default was reasonable and rational, for the following 
reasons: First, Pipe Specialty failed to follow the procedure for 
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seeking relief from default that is established by Utah Code Anno. 
§63-46b-ll(3) (c), in conjunction with Rules 55(c) and 60(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, Pipe Specialty failed to 
establish sufficient cause to set aside its default. 
Finally, the evidence of record supports the ALJ's decision, 
as affirmed by the Commission, that Mr. Montoya is entitled to 
medical expenses and temporary disability compensation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
BECAUSE PIPE SPECIALTY'S MOTION FOR REVIEW TO THE 
COMMISSION WAS UNTIMELY, THE COMMISSION AND THIS COURT 
HAVE NO JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER. 
Mr. Montoya's claim for workers' compensation benefits and 
Pipe Specialty's defenses to that claim are subject to the 
requirements of Utah's Administrative Procedures Act, (Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-l et seq., "UAPA" hereafter.) 
Section 63-46b-12(1)(a) of UAPA allows a party aggrieved by 
an agency order 30 days to either file a request for review, or 
obtain an extension of the 3 0 day period by showing good cause for 
the extension. Maverik v. Industrial Commission, 860 P. 2d 944 
(Utah App. 1993). The filing requirement of §63-46b-12(1)(a) is 
jurisdictional. The Commission has no authority to consider an 
untimely motion for review. Maverik, ibid. 
In this case, the ALJ's decision was signed, dated and 
therefore issued on October 19, 1991. Dusty's v. Tax Commission, 
842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992). Pipe Specialty filed its Motion For 
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Review on November 19, 1991, 31 days later, by hand delivery to the 
Commission. 
Because Pipe Specialty's Motion For Review was filed beyond 
the 30 day period allowed by §63-46b-12 (1) (a) of UAPA, the 
Commission lacked jurisdiction to consider the Motion's merits. 
Maverik v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d at 950. 
The Commission's Order erred in finding that Pipe Specialty's 
Motion For Review had been timely filed. Because of that error, 
the Commission dismissed the Motion on its merits, rather than for 
lack of jurisdiction. Despite the Commission's failure to note its 
lack of jurisdiction, the jurisdictional defect may be raised at 
any stage in the proceeding, and cannot be waived by the parties or 
the Court. Silva v. Department of Employment Security, 786 P. 2d 
246, 247 (Utah App. 1990). 
Not only did Pipe Specialty's untimely Motion For Review 
deprive the Commission of jurisdiction, it likewise deprives this 
Court of jurisdiction. This is so because by failing to file a 
timely Motion For Review with the Commission, Pipe Specialty failed 
to exhaust its administrative remedies. Exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is required as a prerequisite to judicial 
review. Section 63-46b-14(2) of UAPA provides: "A party may seek 
judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies; 
(subject to exceptions not material here)." Pipe 
Specialty's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies 
therefore deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Maverick v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d at 547, 548. 
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In summary, because Pipe Specialty failed to file a timely 
Motion For Review, the ALJ's Order became final on November 18, 
1991. After that date, the Order was no longer subject to review 
by the Commission, or appellate review by this Court. 
POINT TWO 
THE COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE PIPE SPECIALTY'S 
DEFAULT WAS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL AND SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
Even if the Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of 
Pipe Specialty's Petition For Review, the Court should affirm the 
Commission's rejection of Pipe Specialty's request for relief from 
default. 
As an initial point, Pipe Specialty did not comply with the 
procedure established by law and rule for requesting relief from 
default. Section 63-46b-ll((3)(c) of UAPA provides: "A motion to 
set aside a default and any subsequent order shall be made to the 
presiding officer." (Emphasis added.) 
UAPA's requirement that requests for relief from default be 
presented to the presiding officer was a considered decision of the 
drafters of UAPA: 
The intent of Section 4 6b-ll(3) is that the presiding 
officer initially decides whether a default should be set 
aside . . . . (Comments of the Utah Administrative Law 
Advisory Committee on the Drafting and Interpretation of 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Code Co. Law 
Publishers, 1988.) 
The requirement that the presiding officer decide whether 
relief from default is warranted in light of the presiding 
officer's knowledge of the case. In keeping with UAPA's 
requirement that the presiding officer decide whether relief from 
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default is proper, Section 63-46b-ll(3)(c) of UAPA limits the 
Commission's involvement to a purely review function: 
A defaulted party may seek agency review under Section 
63-46b-12, or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, 
only on the decision of the presiding officer on the 
motion to set aside the default. 
If Pipe Specialties had complied with the foregoing 
requirement of UAPA, it would have had the opportunity to present 
all its evidence and argument in support of relief from default-
The ALJ's ruling could then have been reviewed by the Commission 
with the benefit of a complete record. 
Pipe Specialties7 failure to follow the foregoing procedure 
has limited the evidence which is now available not just from Pipe 
Specialties, but also from Mr. Montoya. Having chosen to frame the 
default issue in this way, Pipe Specialty must abide by the 
consequences of its choice. The Commission's denial of Pipe 
Specialty's request for relief from default should be affirmed. 
Aside from Pipe Specialty's failure to follow procedures for 
seeking relief from default, Pipe Specialty has also failed to 
provide evidence that it is entitled to relief from default. 
Under §11(3) of UAPA, default may be set aside under the 
provisions of Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Taken together, Rules 55(c) and Rule 60(b), as 
pertinent to this case, allow relief from default for mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party. 
Pipe Specialty argues that an alleged misrepresentation by Mr. 
Montoya caused it to refrain from filing its Answer to Mr. 
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Montoya,s Application For Hearing. However, the record in this 
matter contains no competent evidence whatsoever of any such 
misrepresentation. The alleged misrepresentation was raised for 
the first time in Pipe Specialty's Motion For Review, but with no 
supporting evidence. Later, after this matter was before the Court 
and as part of the briefing, Pipe Specialty attempted to submit an 
affidavit regarding the alleged misrepresentation. 
There are ways to place evidence of an opposing party's 
misconduct into the record. The evidence could have been presented 
to the presiding officer if Pipe Specialty had followed proper 
procedure. In that case, Mr. Montoya would have had an opportunity 
to respond. Even at the late date of the these proceedings, Pipe 
Specialty could have attempted to augment the record before the 
Court. Whether such an effort would have been successful is 
problematic. Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., 815 P. 2d 1356, 1359 
(Utah App. 1991). However, because Pipe Specialties has taken 
neither of the foregoing steps, its proffered affidavit must be 
disregarded by the Court. Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., ibid. 
Absent that affidavit, there is no evidence to support allegations 
of misrepresentation or misconduct by Mr. Montoya. 
Pipe Specialty also contends that it did not receive notice 
that default had been entered against it. The Commission has 
addressed this point in its Order Denying Motion For Review and has 
simply found it unworthy of belief. The record establishes that 
all documents, including the Default Order, were mailed to the 
proper address. No documents were returned to the Commission as 
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undelivered. Pipe Specialty concedes that it received some 
documents at the given address. Based on the foregoing, the 
evidence supports the Commission's conclusion that Pipe Specialty 
received all required notices and orders and had ample opportunity 
to protect its interests in this matter. 
In summary, Pipe Specialty failed to properly request relief 
from default in this matter and has failed to properly submit any 
competent evidence in support of its request for relief from 
default. The Commission's decision affirming the ALJ's decision 
and refusing to set aside Pipe Specialty's default is reasonable 
and rational and supported by the available evidence properly 
before this Court. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S AWARD OF MEDICAL 
EXPENSES AND TEMPORARY DISABILITY COMPENSATION TO MR. 
MONTOYA. 
The initial decision of the ALJ, as later affirmed by the 
Commission, awarded temporary total disability benefits and medical 
expenses to Mr. Montoya. Pipe Specialty argues that the evidence 
before the ALJ and Commission is insufficient to support such an 
award. 
A party attacking the Commission's findings of fact on appeal 
must marshall all the evidence available in the record, including 
the evidence that supports the party's attack, but also any 
evidence that supports the Commission's decision. King v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993). 
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Pipe Specialty has failed to comply with this requirements of 
marshalling the evidence. 
When the available evidence is examined, it uniformly 
supports the Commission's decision. The facts of Mr. Montoya's 
employment by Pipe Specialty, the nature of his accident and the 
resulting injury, the amount of his medical expenses and the period 
of his inability to work are all substantiated in the record. The 
Commission is unaware of any contrary evidence that contradicts any 
part of the Commission's Order. The Commission's findings are, 
therefore, clearly supported by substantial evidence and should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Commission contends that Pipe Specialty's 
Petition For Review should be dismissed, either on jurisdictional 
grounds or on its merits. 
DATED this 28th day of March, 1994. 
By 
Alan Hennebold, General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused 2 true and correct copies of 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH to be served upon 
Petitioner Pipe Specialty Inc. by causing to be placed in an 
envelope addressed to the following: 
James J. Lund 
Attorney at Law 
23 04 S. Berkeley Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
and said envelope was then deposited, sealed, with first class 
postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on the 28th day of March, 1994. 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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ADDENDUM 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING 
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J :J i 
Form 001 Revised 3 / 9 1 
W<Lf 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Industrial Accidents Divis ion 
160 East 3 0 0 South - r.O. Box 5 1 0 2 5 0 
S.L.C., UT 8 4 1 5 1 - 0 2 5 0 
NOTE: PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN BLACK INK 
Applicant (Employee) 
The Industrial Commission has 
the following documents on file: 
Medical • 
Employer Report D 
First Payment Report D 
Copies of the above documents 
will be provided upon request 
Maiden Name a n d / o r Other Name(s) Used 
i L£JL 
* 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING 
Employer * f^^OQ 
Employer's Street Address 
9 ^ * 
Employer's Insurance Carrier 
APPLICANT ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 35: 
1. I sus ta ined an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment with Defendant (employer) 
on the / day of O CfTp fi £, £ , 19 9 / , at the following location: (Give name & complete 
address or nearestjunction, mile marker, etc.) OS H ^ - / ft/ u J ^ s T T'O JjFVd AMO f A \\ 
Across /^MC jpi±(\vT ' -. "T7~r > ' 
2. The accident occurred a s follows: (Describe accident and resulting injuries (Bodypart(s) injured) £/ Tf t A) <i 7 O x" £ C 
hH 
- T h ^ o p c & ^ p A A / r o , - 6 . 1 T O 
*. The injury caused temporary total di 
>n a s folio 
M 0 ,0<*L 
sability from / Q / , 3 / ? / 
Date returned 
3.  i j   t r r  
Date first off 
4. I have received compensat ion l ws: (Indicate the last paid amounts you received (weekly or monthly) and 
the last payment date.)_ 
5. This Claim is filed because: (Please mark an X in the appropriate space(s)) 
A. X Unpaid Medical Expenses F. Permanent Total Compensation 
B. Recommended Medical Care G. Travel Expenses 
C. Temporary Total Compensat ion H. Interest 
D. Temporary Partial Compensation I. y Other (specify) J M A) CT~ <j <*JT* ^ *l 
P ^ / f t f^*>r /HyT~ T V ^ ^ o^t~ ^ £ / L 7 < -E. Permanent Partial Compensation 7 TV 
IN ADDITION, THE CLAIMANT ALLEGES: (Please fill in or mark appropriate blank) 
My date of bir th is (& / Q~/ C 0 . At the time of injury my wage was $ i t . ^ 
Date /o /j a / 5 / 
week; month; or other (if other, specify method of payment) and I was working hours per week. 
I fA. was / was not married and had / children unde r age 18 dependent on me for support . 
Printed Name of Applicant 
^Signature of Applicant / 
93(oa /-/coy r$tf soffk 
Street Address of Applicant 
LAS a o c ^ A) CA tt^of 
Printed Name of Attorney 
Signature of Attorney 
Street Address & Office # of Attorney 
City / State / Zip 
/ 
Telephone 
City / Sta te / Zip of Applicant 
Applicant 's Telephone Social Security # 
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL BE RETURNED 
SIGNATURES CERTIFY READING OF INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE OF T H ^ f P*M\ 
ADDENDUM 
NOTICE OF APPLICATION 
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n 
Norman H Bangerter 
Governor 
Timothy C Allen 
Presiding Administrative Law Judge 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
160 East 300 South 
P O Box 510250 
Salt Lake City Utah 84151 0250 
(801)530 6800 
(801) 530 6804 (Fax) January 30, 1992 
S t e p h e n M H a d l e \ 
Chairman 
Thomas R CarUon 
Commi^iont-
Dixie L Mm^on 
Commi sioncr 
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
KIM MARGETTS 
PIPE SPECIALTY INC 
4425 WEST 12600 SOUTH 
RIVERTON UT 84065 
Gentlemen: 
Re: Salvador D Montoya 
Inj: 10-01-91 
Emp: Pipe Specialty 
(UNINSURED) 
We are enclosing a copy of the above named employee's 
Application for Hearing which has been filed with the Commission. 
You must file with the Commission a written Answer to said 
Application within thirty (3 0) days from the date of this letter. 
Said Answer may be in letter form, but should either admit or deny 
liability for the claim. It should either admit, deny, or 
specifically respond to every paragraph of the application form. 
You must set forth any affirmative defenses you may have or you may 
be precluded from raising such defenses at any hearing on the 
claim. Failure to file an Answer within thirty (30) days may 
result in an entry of your default and the Commission will proceed 
without further notice to you to enter an Order disposing of the 
Application. 
BY DIRECTION: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
a. 
C o ? 
<?!§ 
LL ;O U_ 
CO f -
r- E ° 





























o c a 
By / l A ^ L A x . 
M a r j o r i e # e l e , C l e r k 










S86I. aunp '008€ WJOJ S J 
fay 28 South, Las Cruces 
S, Riverton UT 84065 
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r v^  INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 91001181 
SALVADOR D MONTOYA, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* . • 
V. * DEFAULT ORDER 
* 





An Application for Hearing having been filed with the 
Commission in this case on October 24, 1991; and the Commission 
having transmitted a copy of said Application to the defendants, 
Pipe Specialty, on January 30, 1992, advising defendants to file an 
Answer to said Application within thirty (30) days from date of 
mailing of said Application or suffer default to enter, and have 
the Commission proceed without further notice to said defendant; 
and defendants having failed to file an Answer, said default is 
hereby entered this 2 0 :k(< AA,^.f(OtAy\^f(l (Qq ^ 
r OA 
' &^>^ 
Donald L George 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified this 20th day of 
March 1992. 
ATTEST: 
/ s / Patricia Ashby 
P a t r i c i a Ashby 
Commission Sec re t a ry 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached 
DEFAULT ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid on Marrh ?03 1QQ? 
to the following persons at the following addresses: 
Salvador D Montoya, 43 62 Highway 28 South, Las Cruces NM 
88005 
Pipe Specialty Inc, 4425 W 12600 S, Riverton UT 84065 
Joyce Sewell, Administrator, Uninsured Employers Fund 
Cynthia A Anderson, Atty, Uninsured Employers Fund 






THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 91-1181 
14* 
SALVADOR D. MONTOYA, * 
* FINDINGS OF FACT 
Applicant, * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
* AND ORDER 
vs. * 
* 




* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Donald 
L. George, one of the Administrative Law Judges of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah on October 15, 1992 on the application of 
Salvador Montoya for an award of temporary total compensation and 
payment of medical expenses incurred as the result of an indus-
trial accident. The applicant was present by telephone from his 
home in New Mexico. The default of the defendant, Pipe Special-
ties, Inc., was issued on March 20, 1992 for failure to respond 
to the application within the time required by the rules of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. The Uninsured Employers' Fund 
appeared through its counsel, Thomas C. Sturdy. The applicant 
testified on his behalf and the medical records pertinent to Mr. 
Montoya's injuries were admitted in evidence. Based upon that 
testimony and evidence, the Industrial Commission of Utah now 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On October 1, 1991, while pursuing the business of his 
employer, defendant JPipe Specialties, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
the applicant suffered an industrial accident when a jig holding 
a large section of pipe broke and dropped the pipe on Mr. 
Montoya7s foot, fracturing the proximal phalanx of the left great 
toe. The accident occurred near Pocatello, Idaho. Mr. Montoya 
had worked for Pipe Specialties within the State of Utah within 
the previous six months. 
The Bannock Memorial Medical Center, Pocatello, Idaho, and 
Alan C. Davis, M.D., Las Cruces, New Mexico, treated Mr. 
Montoya/s injury. The medical bills are: $432.25 owing to the 
Bannock Regional Medical Center and $503.00 owing to Dr. Davis. 
At the time of the accident, Mr. Montoya was working an 
average of 55 hours per week and earning $11.00 per hour. He was 
married and had one child who was dependent on him for support. 
Mr. Montoya was totally disabled from the day of the acci-
00 320 
dent until Dr. Davis released him to return to work on January 3, 
1992. 
Pipe Specialties, Inc. had no worker's compensation insur-
ance at the time of Mr. Montoya's accident. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The applicant sustained a compensable industrial accident on 
October 1, 1992, while employed by defendant Pipe Specialties, 
Inc., when a large section of pipe dropped on his foot and 
fractured the proximal phalanx of the left great toe. 
The defendant is liable for Applicant's medical expenses 
reasonably related to the industrial injury. 
The applicant is entitled to temporary total disability 
compensation benefits for the period from October 2, 1991 to 
January 3, 1992 when he was released to return to work by his 
treating physician. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Pipe Specialties, Inc. shall pay 
all medical expenses incurred by the applicant as the result of 
the industrial accident including, but not limited to, $432.25 
owing to the Bannock Regional Medical Center, and $503.00 owing 
to Dr. Alan C. Davis. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Pipe Specialties, Inc., 
pay to Salvador Montoya temporary total compensation at the rate 
of $378.00 per week for 13.4286 weeks for a total of $5,706.01 
for temporary total disability from October 2, 1991 through 
January 3, 1992. These benefits are accrued and shall be paid in 
a lump sum with interest of 8% per annum commencing January 3, 
1992. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the applicant shall be entitled 
to recover all attorneys fees and costs incurred in collecting 
this award from Pipe Specialties, Inc., pursuant to UCA §35-1-59. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Pipe Specialties, Inc., 
becomes or is insolvent, appoints or has appointed a receiver, or 
otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or 
other security to pay the amounts required to be paid by this 
Order, the compensation and benefits shall be paid by the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund in accordance with the Medical and Surgical 
Fee Schedule of the Commission. In the event of payment by the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund, it shall be subrogated to all of the 
rights of the applicant to collect the sums due and owing by Pipe 
Specialties, Inc., pursuant to UCA §35-1-107. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of 
00321 
the date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and 
not subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
^5(J> JQ O 
Donald L. George 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
/?t£s day of October, 1992. 
ATTEST: 
^
 yL yc-r.^ ^y ft .yhiML, 
Patricia 0. Ashb(V // 
Commission Secretary 
00022 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING^ 
I certify that on the / ^ V ^ a v of / / r />:; Z^ _.-, , :-1992, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order by depositing the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Salvador D. Montoya 
4 3 62 Highway 28 South 
Las Cruces, NM 84065 
Pipe Specialties, Inc. 
4425 West 12600 South 
Riverton, UT 84 065 
Joyce A, Sewell, Administrator 
Uninsured Employers' Fund 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146612 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612 
Thomas C. Sturdy 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146612 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612 








MOTION FOR REVIEW 
0 n r I 1 
e 
James J. Lund 5751 ' i r \P : 
Attorney for Defendant ^ )\? 
10 West 100 South #710 ij I Vl 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 I'M ! MOV ; f wop 
Telephone: (801) 575-8311 i\\\\\ 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Salvador D. Montoya 
Apphcant 
Pipe Specialties, Inc., 
Defendant 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Judge Donald George 
Defendant moves the Commission, pursuant to Commission Rules and Utah Code 
Ann. Section 35-1-82.52 (1988 Repl. Vol ) to review its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order entered on the 19th day of October 1992. The basis for Defendant's 
motion for Review is as follows: 
1. Apphcant is currently and has been in the employ of Defendant subsequent 
to the alleged accident date. 
2. While in the employ of Defendant, Apphcant told Defendant he no longer 
wished to pursue a claim against Defendant. 
3. Based on such representations, Defendant did not respond, to Claimant's 
Application, by filing on answer. 
4. Further, Defendant received Notice of Cancellation of Hearing from the 
Commission dated April 2, 1992. 
5. Thereafter, Defendant received no further notice from either the Commission 
or Apphcant that any action was still pending against it. 
6. Under such understanding Defendant did not apprise the undersigned of any 
action pending. 
00033 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH 
Page Two 
7, The undersigned has been active in representing Defendant in various legal 
matters including a separate matter before the Commission involving Mr. 
Lester Hunt as applicant. 
8. As counsel for Defendant the undersigned has never received any notice 
concerning Applicant's application. 
Based on the foregoing Defendant seeks a Hearing and Review on the merits of AppKcant's 
Application and a reasonable and fair opportunity to consider the evidence put forth by 
Applicant in Support of the award entered by way at Order by the Commission on October 
19, 1992. 
DATED this 19th day of November, 1992 
/Japfes J. Lun^K 
^Attorney for De t r  f r fendant 
00034 
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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case Number 91001181 
Salvador D. Montoya,
 /A w * 
Applicant, * 
vs. ^c ^ r,y ^ _ * ORDER DENYING 
J^^-YA^ >l0'-\ * MOTION FOR 





The Industrial Commission of Utah ("commission11) issues this 
order pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and Section 
63-46b-12. 
On November 19, 1992, Pipe Specialties, Inc. ("respondent") 
timely filed a motion for review of the Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law and Order entered by an administrative law judge 
("ALJ") of the commission in the above captioned matter on October 
19, 1992. 
The respondent requests that the commission grant a hearing 
and review the merits of the applicant/s claim. The respondent's 
request is based upon its claim that it received no notice of the 
pending action following the Notice of Cancellation of Hearing 
dated April 2, 1992. 
Review of the record in this matter shows that the respondent 
received notice of the following: (1) Application for Hearing by 
certified letter dated January 30, 1992; (2) Notice of Hearing 
dated March 19, 1992; (3) Default Order for failure of respondents 
to file an answer to the application for hearing dated March 20, 
1992; (4) Interrogatories to Applicant dated March 31, 1992; (5) 
Notice of Cancellation of Hearing dated April 2, 1992; (6) Notice 
of Hearing on October 16, 1992 dated July 20, 1992; (7) Findings of 
Fact Conclusions of Law and Order dated October 19, 1992; (8) 
Abstract of Award dated October 19, 1992; (9) Supplemental Order 
Awarding Attorneys Fees dated November 4, 1992; and (10) Abstract 
of Award dated November 4, 1992. 
The file contains no notice that Mr. Lund was representing the 
respondent in this matter. All notices described above were mailed 
to the respondent at its address in Riverton, Utah and none were 
returned. It is unreasonable for the respondent to assert that 
notice should have been sent to his attorney when no notice of 
representation had been filed with the commission. We believe that 
the respondent had ample notice and opportunity to appear or file 
pleadings in this matter. 
The respondent further claims that the applicant made 
representations that he no longer wished to pursue his claim 
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against the respondent and that the applicant's representation 
caused the respondent not to file an answer to the application for 
a hearing. It appears, then that the respondent is attempting to 
articulate an estoppel argument in support of granting a new 
hearing. 
A party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on representations or 
acts if they are contrary to his own knowledge of the truth or if 
he had the means by which with reasonable diligence he could 
ascertain the true situation. Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 
465 P.2d 356 (1970); see also Cook v. Cook, 110 Utah 406, 174 P.2d 
434 (1946) . Furthermore, a determination of the issue of estoppel 
is not dependent on the subjective state of mind of the person 
claiming he was misled, but rather is to be based on an objective 
test, i.e., what would a reasonable person conclude under the 
circumstances. Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, Utah, 570 P. 2d 690 
(1977); Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 
(1973) . 
The Industrial Commission has no statutory authority to 
provide equitable remedies1, however, even if we had such 
authority we would not find in favor of respondent under these 
circumstances. Applying a reasonable person standard, we find that 
a new hearing is not warranted in this case. The respondent 
received notice of all pleadings and hearings in this matter and 
chose to ignore them in deference to the alleged misrepresentations 
of the applicant. We believe that a reasonable person would make 
further inquiry with the commission or his attorney if he received 
notices regarding a matter he believed had been resolved. 
Therefore, the respondent's reliance on the alleged 
misrepresentations of the applicant was unreasonable. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law 
judge dated November 19, 1992 is hereby affirmed. 
1
 "[T]he Industrial Commission remains a statutorily-created 
agency, not a court of equity. As such, the Industrial Commission 
has only those powers expressly or impliedly granted to it by the 
legislature." Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790 P.2d 573, 576 
(1990); Utah Copper Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 118, 193 P. 
24, 26 (1920). 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the 
Utah Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of the Order, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, 
and 63-46b-16, and Bonded Bicycle Couriers v. Dept. of Employment 
Security, Case No. 920621-CA (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1992). The 
requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of 
the hearing for appeals purposes. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Commissioner 
Certified this &tZ day of/fr^^A-^-^ 1993. 
AT3 
Patricia O. Ashby/ 
Commission Secretary ^ 
00341 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ' of January, 1993, the 
attached ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of Salvador 
Montoya was mailed, postage pre-paid to the following persons at 
the following addresses: 
Salvador Montoya 
4362 Highway 28 So 
Las Cruces, NM 84065 
Pipe Specialties, Inc 
4425 W 12600 S 
Riverton UT 84065 
Joyce Sewell, Administrator 
UEF 
Thomas C, Sturdy, Atty 
UEF 
Judge Donald L. George 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 






MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
JAMES J. LUND #5751 
Suite 710 Crandall Building 
10 west 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Telephone: (801) 575-8311 
Facsimile: (801) 575-8340 
Attorney for Defendant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
SALVADOR MONTOYA, an individual, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
PIPE SPECIALTY, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, ; 
Defendant. : 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
: Case No. 
Defendant, Pipe Specialty, by and through its counsel, James 
J. Lund, hereby moves the Division to reconsider the Division's 
Order denying review previously sought by Defendants Motion for 
Review. The basis for this Motion for Reconsideration is as 
follows: 
1. By Defendant's previously filed Motion for Review on or about 
fJpi/r^far f*f of 1992, the Division was apprised of the 
undersigned's representation of Defendant. 
1 
00044 
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2. The Division, through denying Defendant's Motion for Review, 
failed to give notice to the undersigned because it. omitted 
the undersigned's name and address to the mailing or service 
certificate that accompanied the Division's Order dated 
Qa^iUd^u (? /9#1 denying the Defendant's Motion for Review. 
3. In subsequent communication with General Counsel for the 
Industrial Commission, in March of 1993 the undersigned had 
confirmed to him the fact that improper or inadequate notice 
of the Division's Order denying the Defendant's Motion for 
Review had been given. 
4. Because of the inadequate and/or improper and untimely notice 
Defendant's appeal rights from the Division's Order denying 
the Defendant's Motion for Review were obviated. 
5. The appeal time frame began running from the date of the 
Division's Order or ^JZ^U^^Y / /??} 
6. Defendant and its officers, being out of town on work was not 
apprised of the Division's Order denying Defendant's Motion 
for Review and therefore could not timely notify the 
undersigned of any action by the Division. 
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant, by and through the 
counsel of record, James J. Lund, hereby respectfully submits 
this Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this £ — day of April, 1993. 
fes J. Lu| 
Attorney for Defendant 
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